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Reply Argument 
Appellees, Modular Manufacturing, LLC ("Modular"), Investors Collaborative, 
LLC ("Investors"), and Roger Hoffman ("Hoffman"), (collectively "Appellees"), fail to 
persuade that summary judgment was properly granted on this record. This Court should 
reverse the trial court's summary judgment rulings and remand for further proceedings 
which must include resolution of the Motion to Compel discovery filed by Appellants, Al 
Cea and Laura Cea (collectively the "Ceas"). 
I. Summary Judgment Should Be Reversed Because Discovery Was Not 
Complete When Summary Judgment Was Granted. 
This Court should reverse the trial court's summary judgment rulings and remand 
this case for further proceedings to resolve the Ceas' Motion to Compel discovery. 
Appellees cannot refute this truth. Even if summary judgment was otherwise appropriate 
on all other grounds—which it was not—reversal on this ground alone is proper. 
a. The Ceas' Motion to Compel Was Filed Prior To Oral Arguments on 
Appellees' Motions for Summary Judgment. 
In March 2010, the Ceas filed a Motion to Compel seeking an order compelling 
Appellees to respond to discovery requests which had not been adequately responded to. 
(R. 1499-1517.) Appellees' Motions for Summary Judgment ("Appellees' Motions") 
came before the court for oral arguments on July 13, 2010. (R. 1676.) The Ceas brought 
their Motion to Compel to the trial court's attention in the Ceas' oppositions to 
Appellees' Motions. (R. 1043, 1147.) The court was also made aware of the Ceas' 
Motion to Compel at oral arguments on Appellees' Motions. (R. 1847 at 5:12-15.) 
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Thus, the trial court was informed of the Ceas' Motion to Compel before it granted 
Appellees' Motions. The Ceas submitted their Motion to Compel for decision and it was 
scheduled for oral arguments before the court issued its decisions on Appellees' Motions. 
(R. 1677-78, 1682, 1685-93.) The Ceas' Motion to Compel was not resolved by the court 
when the court granted summary judgment. Discovery, therefore, was not complete 
when the summary judgment rulings were rendered. It is important to note, however, that 
while this appeal was pending the trial court heard oral arguments on the Ceas' Motion to 
Compel. (R. 1840.) Notably, the trial court dismissed the Ceas' Motion to Compel 
without prejudice because of this appeal. (R. 1840.) The court explained it is prepared to 
rule on the Ceas' Motion to Compel if this Court remands proceedings to the trial court, 
b. Summary Judgment Is Improper When Discovery Is Not Complete. 
"[S]ummary judgment should not be granted if discovery is incomplete since 
information sought in discovery may create genuine issues of material fact sufficient to 
defeat the motion." Bluemel v. Freestone, 2009 UT App 16, D 5, 202 P.3d 304 (quoting 
Downtown Athletic Club v. Horman, 740 P.2d 275, 278 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)); Callioux 
v. Progressive Ins. Co., 745 P.2d 838, 840 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). The court knew 
discovery was not complete and should not have granted Appellees' Motions. {See id.) 
Appellees attempt to rebut this more than compelling ground for reversing the trial 
courts' orders by erroneously arguing (1) that the Ceas should have filed a Rule 56(f) 
Motion pursuant to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and (2) the timeliness of the Ceas' 
Motion to Compel. (Appellees' Brief at 31-33.) Appellees' arguments fail and are 
unpersuasive because a Rule 56(f) motion is not necessary to preclude denial of a Motion 
2 
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for Summary Judgment on grounds that discovery is not yet complete, and because the 
timeliness of the Ceas' Motion to Compel is not properly before this Court. 
i. A RULE 56(f) MOTION WAS NOT REQUIRED. 
Appellees, without citing any authority, erroneously argue that the Ceas "waived" 
their argument that discovery is not yet complete "because they never filed a Rule 56(f) 
motion." (See Appellees' Brief at 31.) Rule 56(f) provides one method for postponing 
resolution of a motion for summary judgment until additional discovery is completed. It 
is not necessary, however, to defeat a motion for summary judgment on those grounds. 
(See Bluemel, 2009 UT App 16 at ^ 8 (treating a party's motions to compel and Rule 
56(f) motion as distinct and finding, "[I]t was improper for the district court to enter 
summary judgment without addressing those [pending motions to compel]," and then 
acknowledging further, "Similarly . . . the district court erred by failing to address this 
[Rule 56(f)] motion prior to entering summary judgment").) 
Thus, it is immaterial that the Ceas did not file a Rule 56(f) motion because they 
are treated separately from discovery motions and both are proper grounds for precluding 
summary judgment. (See id.) This is clear from the purpose of Rule 56(f), which is to 
prevent a trial court from hastily granting a motion for summary judgment when a party 
has not had a fair opportunity to conduct discovery. (See Vicknair v. Phelps Dodge 
Indus., 2011 ND 39,1119, 794 N.W. 2d 746 (the "underlying purpose" of Rule 56(f) is to 
ensure a "fair opportunity to conduct discovery," "to safeguard against judges swinging 
the summary judgment axe too hastily," and "to prevent a rush to summary judgment 
when a party has been denied a fair opportunity to conduct discovery").) 
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In the case at bar, the parties had engaged in formal discovery. As set forth in the 
Ceas' Motion to Compel, however, Appellees did not provide adequate responses. (R. 
1499.) As such, a Rule 56(f) motion was not necessary because the Ceas did not seek 
"additional" discovery, but rather sought to compel adequate responses to discovery. 
Therefore, an affidavit and separate motion (as would have been filed pursuant to 
Rule 56(f) if "additional" discovery was needed), was not necessary to inform the trial 
court (a) that discovery was not yet complete, (b) what information the Ceas were 
looking for, (c) where the Ceas thought that information might be, and (d) how the Ceas 
planned on obtaining that information. (See Simon v. Safeway, Inc., 217 Ariz. 330, 333 
(Ct. App. 2007) (explaining that "the precise purpose" of a Rule 56(f) motion is to allow 
a party opposing a motion for summary judgment to state that "it cannot provide facts to 
justify its position," to inform the court of "what information it is looking for, where it 
thinks the information is, and how it plans on obtaining that information").) The trial 
court was made aware of that information by the Ceas' Motion to Compel. 
Finally, even if a Rule 56(f) motion was required, the Ceas, by filing their 
Motion to Compel, in their opposition to Appellees' Motions, and at oral arguments on 
Appellees' Motions, sufficiently informed the court that further discovery was required. 
(See Parson v. Marathon Oil Co., 960 P.2d 615, 618 (Alaska 1998) (a party seeking Rule 
56(f) relief need not specifically mention Rule 56(f) or file a separate motion).) 
The Ceas informed the court that discovery was not yet complete and that their 
Motion to Compel was pending. The court therefore erred in granting summary judgment 
before the Motion to Compel was resolved. (Bluemel, 2009 UT App 16 at ^ 5.) 
4 
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ii. TIMELINESS OF THE MOTION TO COMPEL IS NOT 
BEFORE THIS COURT. 
Appellees improperly argue that the Ceas' Motion to Compel was untimely. That 
issue is not before this Court. Appellees argue that, without a decision from the trial 
court on this issue, the Ceas' Motion to Compel is untimely because: (1) discovery was 
complete as the deadline had passed; and (2) the Ceas did not file their Motion to Compel 
until after Appellees filed their Motions. (Appellees' Brief at 31-33.) Neither argument is 
persuasive. First, the discovery deadline and the elapsing thereof are not dispositive. The 
Ceas' Motion to Compel is timely. (R. at 1499-1517.) Second, the timing of the Ceas' 
Motion to Compel relative to Appellees' Motions for Summary Judgment is not 
dispositive of whether the Ceas' Motion to Compel is proper. 
Most importantly, however, whether the Ceas' Motion to Compel is untimely is 
not before this Court. Timeliness of the Motion to Compel is a matter for the trial court 
to determine when it resolves that motion on remand. 
The fact the Motion to Compel was filed after Appellees' Motions is immaterial. 
The court should not have granted summary judgment without resolving the Motion to 
Compel. The court was informed of that motion in the Ceas' opposition to, and in oral 
argument on, Appellees' Motions. (R. 1043, 1147, 1847 at 5:12-15.) Additionally, the 
Motion to Compel was submitted for decision and set for oral arguments before the trial 
court issued the memorandum decisions on Appellees' Motions. (R. 1677-78, 1682, 
1685-93.) The Ceas' legitimate discovery concerns should have been resolved by the 
trial court before summary judgment was granted on Appellees' Motions. 
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II. Summary Judgment Should Be Reversed Because Genuine Issues of 
Material Fact Exist. 
In addition to the fact that discovery matters remained unresolved at the time 
summary judgment was granted, this Court should reverse the orders granting summary 
judgment because genuine issues of material fact exist. 
a. Scope Of The Summary Judgment Motions And This Appeal Are Not 
Limited To One Document, 
Appellees incorrectly assert that the only document at issue is the agreement letter 
sent by Modular to the Ceas wherein Modular acknowledged its duty to complete the 
Ceas' home (the "Agreement Letter"). {See Appellees' Brief at 19.) (A copy of the 
Agreement Letter is attached hereto as Addendum 1 ("Add. 1").) Appellees incorrectly 
imply that because certain matters were not pleaded in the Ceas' complaint that those 
matters should not to be considered. {See id.) Thus, Appellees claim the acquisition 
documents executed by and between Modular and ATC Marketing, or facts and evidence 
relating to violations of UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2d-1005(1) are irrelevant. {See id.) 
Appellees fail to recognize that such evidence is directly relevant and supports the Ceas' 
well-plead claims against Appellees, and should have been considered by the trial court 
in deciding Appellees' Motions. 
In addition, Appellees erroneously argue, u[T]he primary issue . . . on appeal is 
whether the Letter constitutes a guaranty agreement by any of the Appellees, and if so, 
whether any of the Appellees should be liable for fraud or negligent misrepresentation 
with respect to the Letter [Agreement]." (Appellees' Brief at 20.) This is false. The 
primary issue is whether summary judgment was properly granted. That issue is 
6 
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immediately resolvable as summary judgment was improper because discovery was not 
complete. That issue is further resolvable on grounds that summary judgment was 
improper because genuine issues of material fact exist. 
b. Material Facts Are Disputed By The Ceas. 
Appellees mistakenly claim, uThe Appellants did not controvert the short 
statements set forth in Appellees' Statements of Facts." (Appellees' Brief at 21.) 
Appellees quote the Ceas' responses to Appellees' Statements of Fact wherein Appellees 
disputed paragraphs 5 through 10 of the Modular and Investors Motion and paragraphs 5 
through 12 of the Hoffman Motion. (Appellees' Brief at 25-26.) 
Appellees include the Ceas' explanation of the grounds for their dispute—that 
each of those paragraphs are legal conclusions and that Appellees attempted to 
characterize Investors and Hoffman as passive parties—together with citations to the 
record where applicable. (Appellees' Brief at 25-26.) Without citing any authority, 
Appellees erroneously argued that the Ceas' did not controvert those facts. (Appellees' 
Brief at 26.) To the contrary, the Ceas identified each statement of fact in dispute and 
stated the basis for each dispute. The facts were thus controverted by the Ceas. 
Appellees incorrectly argue that the Ceas did not strictly comply with the 
"verbatim restatement" and "citation" requirements of Rule 7(c)(3)(B) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. (See Appellees' Brief at 26.) Appellees correctly claim facts should 
be deemed admitted unless controverted. (Id. (citing USA Power, LLC v. PacifiCorp, 
2010 UT 31,1 30, 235 P.3d 749; Bluffdale City v. Smith, 2007 UT App. 25,1 11, 156 
P.3d 175).) Strict compliance with Rule 7, however, is not necessary to controvert a fact. 
i 
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Appellees rely upon USA Power because the Court recognized in a footnote that 
the "trial judge . . . has no discretion in deeming facts admitted unless controverted." 
(Appellees' Brief at 26.) Remarkably, however, the Utah Supreme Court determined that 
despite USA Power's failure to comply with Rule 7 (by not citing relevant materials) 
USA Power had in fact controverted PacifiCorp's statements. (USA Power, 2010 UT 31 
at *P 35.) This holding is the exact opposite of what Appellees argue this Court should 
hold. Furthermore, the Court in USA Power found that a party need not specifically 
controvert a statement of fact with another statement of fact, but rather "that fact can be 
controverted by presenting a contrary inference or theory" and "[e]ven absent a 'complete 
conflict as to certain facts,' a dispute of 'the understanding, intention, and consequences 
of those facts' may defeat summary judgment." (USA Power, 2010 UT 31 at ffi[ 31-32.) 
Similarly, this Court in Bluffdale City, 2007 UT App. 25 at ^ 11, recognized that 
the Utah Supreme Court found a party's "failure to comply with the technical 
requirements of rule 4-501(2)(B) to be harmless."1 (Id. at |^ 9). None of the cases cited by 
Appellees state that compliance with the requirements of Rule 7 is a prerequisite to 
controvert a fact. The Ceas thus successfully controverted Appellees' statements of fact. 
Even if the Ceas did not strictly comply with Rule 7, any such inadequacies are harmless 
errors and do not deem the Appellees' statements as admitted. 
Finally, Appellees incorrectly assert that the facts which were disputed by the 
Ceas—including facts relating the acquisition agreements between ATC Marketing and 
1
 Rule 4-501 (2)(B) refers to the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration which the Court 
recognized to be "former but comparable" to Rule 7(c)(3)(B). Bluffdale City, 2007 UT App. 25 
at p . 
8 
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Modular—are not material because they are allegedly unrelated to the three causes of 
action plead against the Appellees. (Appellees' Brief at 27). Such an assertion is 
remarkable, at a minimum, and fails to recognize that such facts are material because they 
are evidence that the Agreement Letter is an offer—if not a guaranty or memorialization 
of Appellees' contractual obligations—which the Ceas accepted (R. 1126-29) and which 
is the crux of the Ceas' claims against Modular. 
c. Hoffman's Relationship With Modular Is Disputed And Material. 
Appellees' attempt to rebut the Ceas' assertion that a genuine issue of material fact 
exists as to Hoffman's relationship with Modular falls short and is unpersuasive. (See 
Appellees' Brief at 28-29.) Appellees erroneously assert two "fatal flaws" with the Ceas' 
position: (1) facts pertaining to Hoffman's relationship with Modular are not material, 
and (2) the Ceas disputed those facts in the Ceas' "argument" section of their opposition 
to Appellees' Motions. (See Appellees' Brief at 29 (emphasis in original).) 
The facts pertaining to Hoffman's relationship with Modular are material. 
Appellees rely on principles of limited liability to support their assertion that Hoffman 
was "incredulously" sued for something he could not be liable for. (See, e.g., Appellees' 
Brief at 17, 18, 27-29, 41-42.) Appellees then argue that facts showing that Hoffman is 
liable for Modular's conduct and was more than a mere agent of Modular are not 
material. (Id. at 29.) These facts, however, are material to show Hoffman's liability. 
Appellees' argument that the Ceas failed to dispute facts because they did so in the 
argument portion of their oppositions is misplaced. In USA Power, 2010 UT 31 at j^ 35, 
the Court found a party successfully controverted fact by the inferences which could be 
9 
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drawn from that party's arguments in opposition. Thus, Appellees incorrectly argue, 
without citing authority, 'The Appellants needed to cite to affidavit or deposition 
testimony to . . . controvert Appellees' statements of fact." (Appellees' Brief at 29.) 
d. Appellees Mischaracterized Factual Issues As Conclusions Of Law. 
Appellees attempt in vain to characterize as questions of law factual issues of 
whether the Agreement Letter was an offer which was accepted, whether adequate 
consideration existed, and whether Hoffman could be personally liable. (Appellees' Brief 
at 29.) Appellees cite no authority for their assertion that these issues are questions of 
law. (See id.) Appellees state in conclussory fashion, unsupported by authority, that "it 
was for the trial court" to determine these issues. (See id. at 30). 
In contrast, the Ceas established, 
"[WJhere the existence of a contract is the point in issue and the evidence is 
conflicting or admits of more than one inference, it is for the jury to 
determine whether the contract did in fact exist." O'Hara v. Hall, 628 P.2d 
1289, (Utah 1981) (quoting Pre-Fit Door v. Dor-Ways, 13 Ariz. App. 438, 
477 P.2d 557 (1970)). Further, the question of "whether a party accepted 
an offer so as to form a binding contract [is] for the jury to decide." Id. 
(citing Thornton v. Pasch, 104 Utah 313, 139 P.2d 1002 (1943)). 
(The Ceas' Brief at 13 (alterations in original).) Thus, the issues relating to the letter are 
questions of fact not to be decided by the court on summary judgment. 
e. Genuine Factual Issues Remain As To Whether Modular Is 
Contractually Obligated To The Ceas. 
Genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether Modular is contractually 
obligated to the Ceas and whether the Agreement Letter is indefinite and uncertain. 
Appellees argue, "[W]hether a contract is ambiguous because uncertainty in terms is a 
10 
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'question^ of law'" and "'Interpretation of the terms of a contract is a question of law.'" 
(Id. (citing Fitzgeraldv. Corbett, 793 P.2d 356, 358 (Utah 1990) and quoting Covey v. 
Covey, 2003 UT App. 380, U 16, 80 P.3d 553) (alterations in original).) 
Neither case relied upon by Appellees rebut the authority cited by the Ceas'. (See 
Appellants' Brief at 15-16.) In Peterson v. Sundrider Corp., 2002 UT 43, \ 14, 48 P.3d 
918, the Utah Supreme Court recognized that the interpretation of a contract may be a 
question of law or a question of fact determined by extrinsic evidence of intent, (quoting 
Kimball v. Campbell, 699 P.2d 714 (Utah 1985)), and that when an ambiguity exists in a 
contract then summary judgment is improper because the parties' intent is a factual issue 
(citing Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 665 P.2d 1292, 1293 (Utah 1983)).2 
i. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY NOT FINDING THE 
LETTER TO BE AMBIGUOUS. 
The trial court's determination that the Letter was not ambiguous was incorrect. 
See Workman v. Brighton Props., Inc., 1999 UT 30, U 2, 976 P.2d 1209 (questions of law 
reviewed for correctness). The Agreement Letter is at least ambiguous as to Modular's 
intent of whether the letter was a guaranty, a memorialization of a contract, and/or an 
offer to the Ceas. Modular referred to the Ceas as, "Dear Valued Customer". (Add. 1.) 
Modular did not refer to the Ceas as a potential customer or a former customer of ATC 
Marketing. Modular referred to the Ceas as Modular's own "valued customers," 
indicating there was already a relationship between the parties—a fact confirmed by the 
acquisition agreements executed by and between ATC Marketing and Modular. 
2
 In fact, the Ceas' order was identified as a work in progress in the acquisition 
agreements between Modular and ATC Marketing. (R. at 1100-12.) 
11 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
I 
Modular represented, "[ATC Marketing] is no longer capable of completing or 
performing on its contract with you. However, all is not lost." (Add. 1.) Modular then 
explained, "[Modular Manufacturing] has acquired the bulk of ATC [Marketing] assets . . 
. ." (Appellees' Brief at 12; Add. 1) "Although Modular Manufacturing did not purchase 
ATC Marketing itself.. . Modular agreed to complete all work in progress, including 
orders for which deposits have been taken (even if no physical work has commenced)." 
{Id.) Thus, Modular was obligated to complete the Ceas' order. 
Modular assured the Ceas, "[I]f you had an order with ATC Marketing, Modular 
has agreed to complete the work on your home for the previously agreed price." {Id.) 
Modular's intent was clear: the Ceas would receive their home "for the previously agreed 
price." Although the Agreement Letter indicated, "At this point. . . [Modular] will be 
issuing new contracts for your home construction" {Id.), Modular also explained the new 
contracts were "[to] give you the assurance of a valid [c]ontract for performance." {Id. 
(emphasis added).) 
Modular made an offer that, "In lieu of a new contract we will be willing to pay 
you whatever deposits or payments you [sic] made to ATC Marketing . . . should you 
decide that you would prefer to cancel and just walk away." {Id. (emphasis added).) Of 
note is the use of the word "cancel." This affirmed Modular's obligation, indicating the 
letter is a memorialization or guaranty and an offer to relieve Modular of its obligation. 
3
 Notably, the term "assurance" is defined as "a pledge or guarantee." {See BLACK'S LAW 
DICTIONARY, Pocket Edition (1996).) Modular's use of the term assurance is clear 
evidence of Modular's intent to perform ATC Marketing's contracts and complete the 
works in progress including the Ceas' order. 
12 
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Finally, Modular explained, "[If] you decide that you would like to proceed, enter 
into a new contract and have your home completed, there [are s]ome minor modifications 
to terms and payment schedules. However the specifications for the home itself [will not] 
change nor with the price." (Id.) Thus, there were to be only "[s]ome modifications" to 
the Ceas' contract, and all modifications would be "minor". 
These portions of the Agreement Letter establish that the letter is a guaranty or 
memorialization of Appellees' contractual obligation to complete the Ceas' order. In 
addition, Modular presented an offer to the Ceas: to relieve Appellees of their contractual 
obligations in exchange for a refund of the Ceas' deposit. The Ceas accepted the offer 
(R. 1126-29), and thus a binding contractual relationship exists between these parties. 
Appellees cite language within the Agreement Letter which appears to conflict 
with the foregoing provisions. (See, e.g., Appellees' Brief at 12-13.) Utah Courts have 
held that when the "provisions within the four corners of the [agreement] are conflicting 
and cannot be harmonized" the agreement is ambiguous. (See Luncefordv. Lunceford, 
2006 UT App. 266,1 18, 139 P.3d 1073.) It is well accepted, "A contractual term or 
provision is ambiguous if it is capable of more than one reasonable interpretation because 
of uncertain meanings of terms." (See Dairies v. Vincent, 2008 UT 51, ^ 25, 190 P.3d 
1269 (quoting WebBank v. Am. Gen. Annuity Serv. Corp., 2002 UT 88, ^  20, 54 P.3d 
1139).) Thus, the court erred in not finding the letter ambiguous. 
Appellees, without acknowledge the ambiguities, attempt to cast the Agreement 
Letter as too indefinite and uncertain. Appellees' argument is misguided because the 
Agreement Letter is neither indefinite nor uncertain. Modular agreed to complete the 
n 
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Ceas' order for the same price and specifications as the Ceas' agreement with ATC 
Marketing, and offered to refund the Ceas' deposit if the Ceas would relieve Modular of 
that duty. (See Add. 1.) There is no uncertainty. (See Add. 1.) 
The Ceas presented facts sufficient to defeat summary judgment on the issue of 
uncertainty and indefiniteness. Specifically, those facts are as follows. Modular referred 
to the Ceas as "valued customer". Modular's explained, "all is not lost", Modular 
"acquired the bulk of ATC [Marketing] assets," Modular "agreed to complete all work in 
progress, including orders for which depositions have been taken." that "if you had an 
order with ATC Marketing, Modular has agreed to complete the work on your home for 
the previously agreed price." 
There is no doubt of Modular's acknowledgment and assumption of the obligation 
to complete the Ceas' order and Modular's offer that in lieu of completing the Ceas' 
order Modular would refund the Ceas' deposits. The Agreement Letter is not uncertain 
or indefinite. As Appellees note, however, there are terms within the Agreement Letter 
which conflict with one another. These contradicting terms in the Agreement Letter 
which might not be harmonized without extrinsic evidence make the letter ambiguous, 
not uncertain or indefinite. (See Lunceford, 2006 UT App. 266 at |^ 18.) 
ii. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY NOT CONSIDERING ALL 
RELEVANT EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE. 
If nothing else, the trial court should have determined that the language of the 
Agreement Letter could be ambiguous. Because the contract could be ambiguous, the 
trial court was required to—but did not—apply the Ward Rule of Contract Interpretation 
14 
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which necessitates, "When determining whether a contract is ambiguous, any relevant 
evidence must be considered." (Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Ass >?, 907 P.2d 264, 268 
(Utah 1995) (quoting Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. G. W. Thomas Dray age & Rigging Co., 
69 Cal. 2d 33, 442 P.2d 641, 643).) Under the Ward Ru\e, surrounding circumstances are 
not allowed to "create an ambiguity where the language of a contract would not otherwise 
permit," but when the language of the agreement could be ambiguous the trial court must 
look to all relevant evidence to determine whether the agreement is in fact ambiguous. 
(See Daines, 2008 UT 51 at ^ 27.) The Ward Rule allows judges to "consider the writing 
in the light of the surrounding circumstances." (Id.) 
The trial court erred by failing to apply the Ward Ru\c in its determination of 
whether the Agreement Letter was ambiguous. The trial court did not consider relevant 
extrinsic evidence, including the acquisition agreements between Modular and Investors 
which support the Ceas' position that Modular was contractually required to construct the 
Ceas' home and therefore the Agreement Letter is a guarantee or memorialization of a 
contract and an offer to relieve Modular of its duties. This is also why the Ceas must be 
afforded the opportunity to have their Motion to Compel resolved, so that Appellees may 
be compelled to produce relevant evidence which may support the Ceas' arguments. 
iii. BECAUSE THE AGREEMENT LETTER IS AMBIGUOUS, 
THERE REMAIN GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT. 
Because the Agreement Letter is ambiguous, the Ceas correctly asserted in their 
brief that there remain genuine issues of material fact. (See Appellants' Brief at 15-16.) 
15 
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f. Genuine Issues Of Material Fact Exist As To Whether There Was Any 
Fraudulent or Negligent Misrepresentation. 
Appellees cited no authority to rebut Appellants' argument that genuine issues of 
material fact exist as to whether there was any fraudulent or negligent misrepresentations. 
(See Appellees' Brief at 30-31.) The Ceas established in their brief, 
The question of whether or not there was fraud or misrepresentation in this 
case is a question of fact to be determined by a trier-of-fact. See Stuck v. 
Delta Land & Water Co., 227 P. 791, 796 (Utah 1924) (noting that when a 
statement may be interpreted as an opinion or a statement of fact and "there 
is any question as to how it was intended and understood" then whether or 
not it amounts to fraud is a question of fact for the jury); Lakeside Lumber 
Prods, v. Evans, 2005 UT App 87, ^ 9, 110 P.3d 154 ("The existence of 
'fraudulent intent is ordinarily a question of fact . . . .'") (quoting 
Territorial Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Baird, 781 P.2d 452, 462 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989)). 
(Appeallants' Brief at 17-18.) The Ceas have sought discovery on matters which would 
establish that Hoffman and Investors are liable for any conduct undertaken in the name of 
Modular as if they had engaged in that conduct. (R. 1499-1517; Appellants' Brief at 18.) 
Appellees cannot refute the fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims by merely 
asserting that Hoffman and Investors have not made any representations. (See Appellees' 
Brief at 31.) 
Further, the Ceas established that they relied upon Appellees' representations to 
their detriment and did suffer damages as a result, by not seeking to recover the money 
paid to ATC Marketing which was later acquired by Appellees until after Investors 
already looted Modulars' assets. (Appellants' Brief at 18-19; R. 1847 at 33:1-21.) Thus, 
summary judgment was improper on these causes of action, particularly in light of the 
Ceas' pending Motion to Compel factual discovery on these matters. 
16 
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III. The Agreement Letter Is A Guaranty Or Memorialization Of A 
Contractual Obligation And Contains One Or More Offers. 
Appellants incorrectly argue, "As a matter of law, the Letter is not a valid or 
enforceable contract because it is too indefinite and uncertain in its terms." (Appellants' 
Brief at 34.) Appellants rely on only select provisions of the Agreement Letter and 
ignore key provisions which indicate the exact opposite intent on the part of Modular: 
that the Agreement Letter is a guaranty or memorialization of Modular's obligation to 
complete the Ceas' order and contains therein a separate offer to the Ceas as a way to 
divest Modular from its obligation to construct the Ceas' home. (See Add. 1.) 
The definite and certain terms of the Agreement Letter establish that Modular 
considered the Ceas to be Modular's "[v]alued [c]ustomer," that Modular "acquired the 
bulk of ATC[cs] assets," that "Modular agreed to complete all work in progress, 
including orders for which deposits have been taken (even if no physical work has 
commenced)," that "Modular has agreed to complete the work on [the Ceas'] home for 
the previously agreed price," that new contracts would be issued to "give [the Ceas'] the 
assurance of a valid contract for performance," that "in lieu of a new contract [Modular] 
will be willing to pay [the Ceas] whatever deposits or payments [the Ceas] have made to 
ATC Marketing for [the Ceas'] home should [the Ceas] decide that [they] would prefer to 
cancel and just walk away," that if the Ceas decide to continue with Modular then only 
"[s]ome minor modifications to terms and payment schedules" would be made and "the 
specifications for the home itself [will not] change nor will the price." (Add. 1.) 
17 
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It was erroneous to conclude that Modular was not obligated to construct the Ceas' 
home and to conclude that this Agreement Letter did not constitute at least an offer which { 
was validly accepted by the Ceas. At the very least, the Agreement Letter is ambiguous 
and therefore interpretation of the Agreement Letter is a question of fact not to be 
decided on a motion for summary judgment. (See Wilson v. Johnson, 2010 UT App. 137, 
T| 22, 234 P.3d 1156 (summary judgment permitted only when no disputes of material 
fact exist; ambiguity with regard to the intent of contracting parties presents a question of 
fact) (citing UTAH R. CIV. P. 56(c); Dairies, 2008 UT 51 at ^ 25).) 
a. The Agreement Letter Is A Contract Under The U.C.C. 
Appellees claim, "because, at the time of the Letter, there were 'uncertainty' and 
'future negotiations or considerations,' then there cannot be a valid or enforceable 
agreement." (Appellees' Brief at 35.) Appellees fail to recognize the requirements for a 
valid contract as established by the Uniform Commercial Code. Under the U.C.C, only 
three elements are required to form a contract: (1) a writing evidencing a contract for the 
sale of goods; (2) signed; including "any authentication which identifies the party to be 
charged;" and (3) "it must specify a quantity." (Beehive Brick Co. v. Robinson Brick Co., 
780 P.2d 827, 830 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (citations omitted).) The Statute of Frauds 
requires "some writing sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale has been made 
between the parties and signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought." (Id. 
(citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-2-201).) The "writing need not contain all the material 
terms of the contract, and the material terms need not be precisely stated." (Id. (citing 
U.C.C. § 2-201, 1 U.L.A. 147 Official Comment 1).) 
18 
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The Agreement Letter satisfies all requirements for a valid contract between the 
parties. {See Id.) The Agreement Letter evidences, and is a guaranty or memorialization 
of, Modular's contractual obligation to complete the Ceas' order. {See Add. 1.) The 
Agreement Letter was sent on Modular's letterhead and was signed by a Modular 
representative (although the Ceas' copy of the letter does not show the entire signature, 
the letter was clearly signed and Appellees' do not dispute that it was sent by Modular 
{See Appellees' Brief at 5). Finally, the Agreement Letter specifies the quantity of goods 
to be produced. Modular consistently refers to their obligation to construct "your 
home"—specifying that one home, belonging to the Ceas, would be constructed. 
Accordingly, the Agreement Letter satisfies all requirements necessary to 
constitute a valid and binding contract under the U.C.C. Appellees rely on Nielsen v. 
Gold's Gym, 2003 UT 37, 78 P.3d 600, Harris v. Albrecht, 2004 UT 13, 86 P.3d 728, and 
Harmon v. Greenwood, 596 P.2d 636 (Utah 1979), in an unsuccessful attempt to show 
why the Agreement Letter is not a contract. (Appellees' Brief at 35.) Nielsen involved a 
breach of a commercial lease agreement. {Nielsen, 2003 UT 37 at TI 1.) Harris involved a 
contract to procure insurance. {Harris, 2004 UT 13 at [^ 1.) Harmon involved a contract to 
form a business partnership. {See Appellees' Brief at 35; Harmon, 596 P.2d at 637-38.) 
Thus, none of these cases are persuasive indicators of what the U.C.C. requires to form a 
contract for the sale of goods and are thus inapplicable to this case. 
Reversal of the trial court's summary judgment rulings in favor of Appellees is 
further justified because the trial court did not specify whether it analyzed the Agreement 
Letter under the U.C.C. or the common law; though it appears the trial court applied 
10 
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common-law. In opposition to Appellees' Motions, the Ceas explained that the U.C.C. is 
applicable and governs the contracts relating to the Ceas' modular home order, including 
the Agreement Letter. (Amended Opposition to Modular's Motion for Sum Judg (R. 1847 
at 31:4-23.) Appellees, however, have—as they did in their brief on this appeal— 
continuously advocated for the application of common law principles to the construction 
and interpretation of the Agreement Letter. (See Appellees' Brief at 35.) The trial court 
should have specified which body of law it was applying in its interpretation of the 
Agreement Letter. Given that Appellees rely upon cases which applied common-law, 
Appellees' reliance on those cases is misplaced. From the memorandum decisions, it 
appears the trial court failed to apply the U.C.C. because had the trial court done so it 
would have found that the Agreement Letter constitutes a valid and binding contract. (See 
Beehive Brick, 780 P.2d at 830.) The trial court thus erred by failing to apply the U.C.C. 
b. All Material Terms Of The Contract Were Known And Assented To, 
The Contract's Interpretation Is A Question Of Law, And It Was 
Supported By Adequate Consideration. 
Appellees' incorrectly argue that the Ceas "never unconditionally assented to all 
the material terms because they did not know, and could not know, what the final terms 
would be." (Appellees' Brief at 36 (citations omitted).) The Letter Agreement made 
clear, however, that the material terms of the contract—the price and specifications of the 
Ceas' house—were not to be altered. (See Add. 1.) The only terms which were not 
known to the Ceas, were the few "minor modifications to terms and payment schedules." 
(See id. (emphasis added).) Thus, both parties knew all material terms of the contract. 
20 
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Appellees also erroneously argue that the existence of the contract is not a 
question of fact because "there is no conflicting evidence." (Appellees' Brief at 37.) 
Appellees' fail to recognize that the Agreement Letter itself is conflicting and ambiguous, 
and therefore its interpretation is a question of fact. (See O'Hara v. Hall, 628 P.2d 1289 
(Utah 1981).) As explained supra, at a minimum the terms of the Agreement Letter 
could be ambiguous and thus, under the Ward Ru\e of Contract Interpetation, the Court 
should have considered all relevant evidence to determine whether the letter is 
ambiguous. Such relevant evidence includes the correspondence between the Ceas and 
Modular wherein the Ceas attempted on two occasions to accept Modular's offer, as well 
as the contractual agreements between Modular and ATC Marketing establishing that at 
the time this Agreement Letter was written Modular knew it was obligated to construct 
the Ceas' home and therefore this letter was a guaranty or memorialization of that 
obligation. (See Ward, 907 P.2d at 268.) 
Finally, the Agreement Letter does not lack consideration. The Agreement Letter 
is supported by consideration in the form of a bargained-for exchange of promises 
between the parties: that if the Ceas would relieve Modular of its obligation to construct 
the Ceas' home, Modular would refund the Ceas' deposit, and if the Ceas will accept 
Modular's performance in the place of ATC Marketing then Modular is willing (and 
obligated) to do so; where upon Modular would have received additional funds from the 
Ceas for the completion of the Ceas' order. (See Healthcare Servs. Group v. Utah Dep 7 
of Health, 2002 UT 5, ^ 17, 40 P.3d 591 (an exchange of promises is consideration).) 
21 
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IV. The Ceas' Fraud And Negligent Misrepresentation Claims Are Valid. 
a. The Fact That Hoffman And Investors Did Not Sign The Agreement 
Letter Is Immaterial. 
Appellees rely upon the Statute of Frauds to claim that neither Investors nor 
Hoffman may be liable under the Agreement Letter because allegedly neither signed it. 
(Appellees' Brief at 39.) The Utah Revised Limited Liability Company Act, codified at 
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 48-2c-101, et seq. (the "Act") provides, "[P]ersons who assume to 
act as a company without complying with [the Act] are jointly and severally liable for all 
debts and liabilities so incurred." The discovery sought by the Ceas would establish that 
both Investors and Hoffman have assumed to act as a company without complying with 
the Act and would therefore be jointly and severally liable for Modular's liabilities. (See 
id.) Thus, if the trial court had resolved the discovery matters pending before it prior to 
granting Appellees' Motions, the Ceas would have established that the Statute of Frauds 
does not bar Hoffman's and Investors' liability. Therefore, Appellees' Argument should 
not be resolved until after the trial court rules on the Ceas' Motion to Compel. 
b. The Ceas' Claims For Fraud And Negligent Misrepresentation Do Not 
Lack Foundation Because A Binding Contract Exists. 
As established supra, the Agreement Letter is a binding contract under the U.C.C. 
and contains one or more valid offers which the Ceas accepted. Accordingly, Appellees' 
contention that the Ceas' fraud and misrepresentation claims lack foundation because no 
contract exists is unpersuasive. (See Appellees' Brief at 39.) Appellees' argue also that 
the Ceas did not rely upon and were not harmed by Appellees' representations. (See id. at 
40.) Appellees are wrong on all counts. The Ceas relied upon and were harmed by 
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Appellees' misrepresentations when the Ceas did not immediately seek recovery against 
Appellees. (R. 1144.) The Ceas could have sought recovery against Modular while 
Modular was still in operation and had substantial assets. Instead, the Ceas' relied upon 
Appellees' misrepresentations and that delay placed the Ceas in a position where they 
have been forced to seek recovery against an already assetless, non-operating entity. 
V. The Memorandum Decisions Violated Rules 52(a) and 56(d) and The 
Issues Were Preserved For Trial. 
Contrary to Appellees' contentions, the Ceas "timely [brought] the issues [of the 
trial court's memorandum decisions' lack of conformity to the requirements of Rules 
52(a) and 56(d)] to the attention of the trial court, [and] thus provid[ed] the court an 
opportunity to rule on the issue's merits" (see Appellees' Brief at 42) when the Ceas 
objected to the form of Appellees' proposed orders. (R. 1694-1705.) 
Appellees cite Dover Elevator Co. v. Hill Mangum Inv., 766 P.2d 424, 426 n.4 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988), stating that findings and conclusions are not ordinarily required 
"where a case is resolved on motion." (Appellees' Brief at 43.) This, however, is 
inapposite to the Ceas' case because the entire case was not resolved on Appellees' 
motions. Only the causes of action pertaining to Appellees were disposed of on 
Appellees' Motions; the Ceas' case remains pending. Thus, the Ceas' case was not 
resolved on motion and the Ceas' assertion remains persuasive: "Normally, failure to 
comply with Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a) would constitute reversible error." (Dover, 766 P.2d 
at 426.) That in Dover the Court did not reverse the trial court is immaterial as the Court 
recognized that "normally" it would be reversible error. (Id) 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Appellees' arguments that the court's memorandum decisions either complied 
with Rules 52 and 56 or that such compliance is not reversible error, are unpersuasive. 
VI. The Trial Court's Orders Violated Rule 7(1) Because They Failed to 
Conform to the Trial Court's Memorandum Decisions. 
Regardless of whether Rule 7(f) is intended as instruction to counsel, the proposed 
orders failed in numerous substantial and material ways to conform to the court's 
memorandum decisions, and when the trial court signed those orders—even as 
redacted—the courts' orders failed to conform to its memorandum decisions. 
One way in which the orders fail to conform to the memorandum decisions is the 
orders' assertions that certain facts are undisputed. Appellees claim the Ceas "should 
have brought forth any evidence to contradict [the facts in the orders declared to be 
undisputed but which the Ceas claim are disputed]." (Appellees' Brief at 46.) As argued 
supra, however, the Ceas cannot produce such evidence until the trial court resolves the 
Ceas' pending Motion to Compel and orders Appellees to adequately respond to the 
Ceas' discovery requests. 
Additionally, Appellees' argument that the Ceas mischaracterized Appellees' 
unjustified attempt to obtain an award of its "costs" when Appellees drafted the proposed 
orders because the Ceas referred to the "costs" as "attorney's fees" {see Appellants' Brief 
at 47) is immaterial. The Ceas assure this Court that any error in referring to an award of 
"costs" as an award of "attorney's fees" was inadvertent. The fact is, Appellees attempted 
throughout the proposed orders to include orders which were not part of the trial court's 
memorandum decisions, including an attempt to obtain an order awarding costs to 
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Appellees which the trial court had not ordered. The trial court struck Appellees' 
unfounded attempt to seek an order of costs where none had been granted (R. at 1735, 
1740), as the trial court should have done with all of Appellees' other attempts to include 
in the orders that which the trial court had not ordered. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the district court's rulings should be reversed and the case 
remanded for further proceedings. The law firmly calls for that result on this record 
DATED this ^TlL day of May, 2011. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & McCARTHY 
MattWF.MCNult/,111 
Florence M. Vincent 
Alex B. Leeman 
Attorneys for Appellants 
oc 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
I 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
At^ 
"77-I hereby certify that on the c'1 day of May 2011,1 served a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF upon the following, as follows: 
Brad C. Smith 
Stevenson & Smith 
3986 Washington Blvd. 
Ogden, Utah 84403 
Attorneys for John Nipko, ATC Marketing 
and 18 Plus 
y 
D 
D 
D 
U.S. Mail, First Class Postage Paid 
Facsimile 
Hand Delivery 
Overnight Express Delivery 
Christopher Hill 
David M. Wahlquist 
Kirton & McConkie 
60 East South Temple, #1800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0120 
Attorneys for Modular Manufacturing, 
L.L.C., Investors Collaborative, L.L.C. 
and Roger Hoffman 
B ^ U.S. Mail, First Class Postage Paid 
D Facsimile 
D Hand Delivery 
D Overnight Express Delivery 
Bryce B.Higbee 
727 North 1550 East, #175 
Orem, Utah 84097 
Attorney for C. Rick Koerber 
a / U.S. Mail, First Class Postage Paid 
D Facsimile 
D Hand Delivery 
D Overnight Express Delivery 
Mike Nyborg 
1478 North Parkway 
Centerville, Utah 84014 
DK^  U.S. Mail, First Class Postage Paid 
D Facsimile 
D Hand Delivery 
D Overnight Express Delivery 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ADDENDUMS 
Addendum 1 - The Letter, R. 42 
Addendum 2 - Memo Decision re: Hoffman, R. 1685-1687 
Addendum 3 - Memo Decision re: Modular, R. 1688-1690 
Addendum 4 - Order re: Hoffman, R. 1738-42 
Addendum 5 - Order re Modular, R. 1733-37 
Addendum 6 - Ct. of Appeals Permission to Appeal 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ADDENDUM 1 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
MODULAR. MANUFAC1URJNG LLC 
2382 N 1500 W Ogden, Ut. 84404 (801)782-7820 Fax (801)782-7587 
mmmMMmmmmitih (<^0()2clLi'^hHl 
Dear Valued Customer: 
^\s you may be aware, ATC Marketing, LLC, the owner of American TimberCraft has ceased operations effective 
\fovember 12, 2006 and has liquidated all company assets. While this move was a difficult decision for ATC, 
inancial reasons dictated that this route was necessary. 
\ s a customer of ATC Marketing we wanted to take a moment and explain how this situation affects you. 
Dbviously with the dissolution and liquidation of ATC Marketing, the company is no longer capable of completing 
>r performing on its contract with you. However, all is not lost. 
Modular Manufacturing, LLC has acquired the bulk of ATC assets including plant equipment, all proprietary 
>roperty and the trade name of "American TimberCraft." Although Modular Manufacturing did not purchase ATC 
Marketing itself as part of the asset acquisitions, Modular agreed to complete all work in progress, including orders 
or which deposits have been taken (even if no physical work has commenced). Therefore if you had an order with 
^TC Marketing, Modular has agreed to complete the work on your home for the previously agreed price, even 
hough it did not acquire your actual contract from ATC Marketing. 
it this point in time we (as Modular Manufacturing) wil] be issuing new contracts for your home construction 
regardless of what stage of construction it may be in) in order to complete and give you the assurance of a valid 
ontract for performance. In lieu of a new contract we will be willing to pay you whatever deposits or payments you 
ve made to A T C Marketing for your home should you decide that you would prefer to cancel and just walk away. 
• fully understand your frustration with all the apparent past delays and at this point want to pursue a course most 
able to you. 
you decide that you would like to proceed, enter into a new contract and have your home completed, there 
ome minor modifications to terms and payment schedules. However the specifications for the home itself 
.hange nor will the price. 
ze for any stress or inconvenience this situanon may cause, but in the long run we feel that you will be 
with the results. For one thing we will be able to give you a new and^/frw completion date and will be 
MI higher quality assurance and standards. 
i-
>ns 
nnnnd9 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COUNTY OF WEBER, STATE OF UTAH , 
ALCEA.etaL 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ATC MARKETING, L.L.C., et a]., 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
RE; DEFENDANT HOFFMAN 
Case Number: 080901240 
Judge Pamela G. Heffernan 
Defendant Hoffman, filed a Motion and Memorandum for Summary Judgment on 
December 23, 2009. Plaintiff filed a Memorandum in Opposition on January 15, 2010 and 
January 22, 2010 (Amended Memorandum). DeP ;dant filed a Reply Memorandum on February 
5.2010. 
Oral arguments were heard on July 13, 2010, after a Notice to Submit was filed. Plaintiff 
was present and represented by Attorney Florence Vincent. Defendant Hoffman was represented 
by Attorney Christopher Hill. 
The court having read the memorandum and having heard the arguments of counsel rules 
as follows: 
1. The court finds the defendant Hoffman is not personally liable. Defendant Hoffman 
only signed on as an agent for the defendant Modular Manufacturing. Defendant Hoffman 
never made any representations to the Plaintiffs. 
2. The court finds the letter dated NovemW 12, 2006 is not an agreement or guarantee. 
The letter contemplates that future contracts will be issued for construction of the log 
home. The letter is not a guarantee. It lacks any consideration. Defendant Hoffman never 
signed the letter and there is no reference to Defendant Hoffman in the letter. 
3. The Court finds there is no evidence of fraud or misrepresentation by Defendant 
Hoffman. Defendant Hoffman never spoke to Plaintiffs or communicated with Plaintiffs, 
therefore, no fraud or misrepresentation exists by Defendant Hoffman. 
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4. The court will grant Summary Judgment for Defendant Hoffman as to the seventh 
cause of action (Breach of Contract), eighth cause of action (Fraud) and ninth cause of 
action (Negligent Misrepresentation). 
5. Defendant Hoffman will prepare an ordv r for the court to sign. 
o 
Dated this J \ day of August, 2010. 
/ 
• • • / 
/ 
ERNIE W. JONES\ 
District Court Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
1 hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum 
Decision, first class mail and postage prepaid, to the following parties this JfU* day of August. 
2010. 
Florence M. Vincent Christopher S. Hill 
Vancott, Bagley, Cornwell & McCarthy Kirton & McConkie 
36 South State Street, Ste 1900 P.O. Box 45120 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Brad C. Smith Rick Koerber 
Stevenson & Smith FranklinSquires Investments, LLC 
3986 Washington Boulevard 1001 N Ft Canyon Road 
Ogden, Utah 84403 Alpine, Utah 84004 
Mike Nyborg 
1478 North Parkway 
Centerville, Utah 84403 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRIGT 
COUNTY OF WEBER, STATE OF UTAH 
AL CEA, et al. 
Plaintiff. 
vs. 
ATC MARKETING, L.L.C., et al. 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
RE: MODULAR 
MANUFACTURING LLC and 
INVESTORS COLLABORATIVE 
LLC 
Case Number: 080901240 
Judge Pamela G. Heffernan 
On December 24, 2009 Defendant Modular Manufacturing and Investors 
Collaborative filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. A memorandum was also 
submitted. 
The Plaintiff filed a Memorandum i Opposition on January 15, 2010. 
Defendant Modular Manufacturing and Investors Collaborative filed a reply 
memorandum on February 8, 2010. 
A Notice to Submit was filed on February 26, 2010. Oral arguments were 
heard on July 13,2010. 
Plaintiffs were present and represented by Attorney Florence Vincent. 
Defendants were represented by Attorney Christopher Hill. The Court having read 
the memorandum and having heard the oral arguments of counsel rules as follows: 
The Court finds that, 
1. The letter dated November 12, 2006 is not an agreement. The letter is too 
indefinite and uncertain in it's terms. The letter is not a guarantee. It just 
provides an option to enter into a n w contract in the future. The letter is 
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not a binding contract. 
2. The Court finds there is no fraud or negligent misrepresentations by these 
defendants. There is no evidence that these defendants made any 
representations to the Plaintiffs that were fraudulent or negligent 
misrepresentations. 
3. The Court finds there was no contact with the Plaintiffs by Defendants 
Investors Collaborative. Investors Collaborative made no statements to 
Plaintiffs. 
4. The Court finds that Investors Collaborative is not liable for the conduct 
of Modular Manufacturing. 
5. Investors Collaborative did not enter into the letter of November 12, 
2006. Investors Collaborative did not enter into contract with the Plaintiff 
6. The Court will grant Summary Judgment to Defendant Modular 
Manufacturing and Investors Collaborative as to: 
Breach of Contract, Seventh cause of action 
Fraud, eighth cause of action 
Negligent Misrepresentation, ninth cause of action. 
There is no dispute as to material facts. 
7. Defendant will prepare an order for signature by the Court. 
Date this of August, 2010. 
TRNIE W. JONES 
District Court Judge . 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum 
Decision, first class mail and postage prepaid, to the following parties this(^ 
2010. 
chv tiay of August, 
Florence M. Vincent 
Vancott. Bagley, Cornwell & McCarthy 
36 South State Street, Ste 1900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Brad C. Smith 
Stevenson & Smith 
3986 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden. Utah 84403 
Mike Nyborg 
1478 North Parkway 
Centerville, Utah 84403 
Christopher S. Hill 
Kinon & McConkie 
P.O. Box 45120 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Rick Koerber 
FranklinSquires Investments. LLC 
1001 N Ft Canyon Road 
Alpine, Utah 84004 
mi\A. (J i<u i 
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David M. Wahlquist (#3349) 
Christophers. Hill (#9931) 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
60 East South Temple, #1800 
P.O. Box 45120 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0120 
Telephone: (801) 328-3600 
Facsimile: (801) 321-4893 
dwahlquist@kmclaw.com 
chill@kmclaw.com 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Modular Manufacturing, LLC, Investors 
Collaborative, LLC and Roger Hoffman 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
AL CEA, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
V. 
ATC MARKETING, L.L.C., et al, 
Defendants. 
[PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING 
DEFENDANT ROGER HOFFMAN'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No.: 080901240 
Judge Pamela G. Heffernan 
Defendant Roger Hoffman's ("Hoffman") Motion for Summary Judgment (the "Motion") 
came on for hearing on for hearing on July 13, 2010 before the Honorable W. Jones. Christopher 
S. Hill of Kirton & McConkie appeared on behalf of Defendant Hoffman; Florence M. Vincent 
of Van Cott Bagley Cornwall & McCarthy appeared on behalf of the Plaintiffs Al and Laura Cea 
(the "Ceas"). Having reviewed Hoffman's memoranda in support of the Motion and Ceas' 
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memorandum in opposition, having heard the oral argument of counsel and being fully briefed in 
all matters pertaining hereto, and having issued a memorandum decision on August 19, 2010, the 
Court hereby enters the following conclusions of law and order: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Based upon the undisputed facts that Hoffman never made any personal 
representations to the Ceas and that any action by Hoffman was limited to his capacity as a 
representative of the entity, the Court concludes that Hoffman is not personally liable for the 
actions of Modular Manufacturing, LLC ("Modular") and/or Investors Collaborative, LLC 
("Investors"). 
2. Based upon the undisputed facts regarding the content and issuance of the letter 
dated November 12, 2006 (the "Letter") that is the subject of the Ceas's Complaint against 
Hoffman, including that the Letter contemplated future contracts, that there was no consideration 
for the Letter, and that Hoffman did not sign the Letter nor was he referenced therein, the Court 
concludes that the Letter does not constitute a contract, agreement or a guaranty. 
3. Based on the undisputed fact that Hoffman never made any representations to 
Ceas or communicated with the Ceas in any regard, the Court concludes that Hoffman did not 
commit a fraud or make any misrepresentation (negligent er otherwise^ to the Ceas. 
~~^f 
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ORDER 
Based upon these conclusions and Hoffman's supporting memoranda, the Court hereby: 
1. GRANTS Hoffman's Motion for Summary Judgment in its entirety and enters a 
judgment of dismissal in favor of Hoffman and against the Ceas, dismissing with prejudice 
Plaintiffs' Seventh Cause of Action (Breach of Contract), Eighth Cause of Action (Fraud) and 
Ninth Cause of Action (Misrepresentation) as to Defendant Hoffman. 
It is further order^d^hatT^Taintiffs' MotionJoXonrpetTTiIed on or about March 
1, 2010, is MOpTr^fhe hearing on that mc^ierCwhich is set for October 26, 2010, is hereby 
stricken. 
As between Hoffjnan-and-1ite€eas; Iloffman is"the~prevailing party. As such, 
Hoffman is entitled to an award of his costs m.curre3in this matter pursuant to Rule 54(d)(1) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procgd^feTHoffman may serve and file his request for costs in 
accordance with Rule 54(d)(2) within five business (5) business days after the entry of this order. 
The arpotint requested may be done jointly with Modular and Investors in a single memorandum 
of costs. 
DATED this J 2 £ day o f _ ^ < j £ ^ ^ 20 f^. 
BY THE COURT 
Heriorable Ernie W. Jones 
Second District Court Judge 
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This Order Granting Roger Hoffman's 
Motion for Summary Judgment is approved as to form: 
KIRTON & McCONKlE 
By: 
Christopher S. Hill 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Modular Manufacturing, LLC, Investors 
Collaborative, LLC and Roger Hoffman 
VAN COTT BAGLEY CORNWALL & McCARTHY 
By: 
Florence M. Vincent 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
Al and Laura Cea 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
1 hereby certify that on the day of August, 2010, ] caused a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing (PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT ROGER 
HOFFMAN'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT to be delivered in the following 
mariner: 
Matthew F. McNulty, III 
Florence M. Vincent 
VANCOTT, BAGLEY, 
CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
36 South State Street, #1900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Rick Koerber 
6248 Lone Rock Road 
Highland, UT 84003-3723 
Mike Nyborg 
1478 North Parkway 
Centerville, UT 84014 
Brad C. Smith 
STEVENSON & SMITH, P.C. 
3986 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden, UT 84403 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
(X) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
(X) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
(X) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
(X) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
13609-00O3/4824-1O85-287I 
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David M. Wahlquist (#3349) 
Christopher S. Hill (#9931) 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
60 East South Temple, #1800 
P.O. Box 45120 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0120 
Telephone: (801) 328-3600 
Facsimile: (801) 321-4893 
dwahlquist@kmclaw.com 
chill@kmclaw.com 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Modular Manufacturing, LLC, Investors 
Collaborative, LLC and Roger Hoffman 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
AL CEA, et al . 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
ATC MARKETING, L.L.C, et al, 
Defendants. 
[PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING 
DEFENDANTS MODULAR 
MANUFACTURING, LLC AND 
INVESTORS COLLABORATIVE, LLC'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No.: 080901240 
Judge Pamela G. Heffernan 
Defendants Modular Manufacturing, LLC ("Modular") and/or Investors Collaborative, 
LLC ("Investors") Motion for Summary Judgment (the "Motion") came on for hearing on for 
hearing on July 13, 2010 before the Honorable Ernie W. Jones. Christopher S. Hill of Kirton & 
McConkie appeared on behalf of Defendants Modular and Investors; Florence M. Vincent of 
Van Cott Bagley Cornwall & McCarthy appeared on behalf of the Plaintiffs Al and Laura Cea 
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(the "Ceas"). Having reviewed Modular and Investors^ joint memoranda in support of the 
Motion and Ceas' memorandum in opposition, having heard the oral argument of counsel and 
being fully briefed in all matters pertaining hereto, and having issued a memorandum decision on 
August 19, 2010, the Court hereby enters the following conclusions of law and order: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Based upon the undisputed facts that Investors never made any representations to 
the Ceas, and that any action by Investors was limited to its capacity as a representative of 
Modular, the Court concludes that Investors is not personally liable for the actions of Modular. 
2. Based upon the undisputed facts regarding the content and issuance of the letter 
dated November 12, 2006 (the "Letter") that is the subject of the Ceas's Complaint against 
Modular and Investors, including that the Letter contemplated future contracts, that there was no 
consideration for the Letter, and that the Letter is too indefinite and uncertain in its terms, the 
Court concludes that the Letter does not constitute a contract, agreement or a guaranty. 
3. Based on the undisputed fact that Investors never made any representations to 
Ceas or communicated with the Ceas in any regard, the Court concludes that Investors did not 
commit a fraud or make any misrepresentation (negligent or otherwise) to the Ceas. 
4. Based on the undisputed facts regarding the content and issuance of the Letter and 
in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the Court concludes that Modular did not commit 
a fraud or make any misrepresentation (negligent or otherwise) to the Ceas. 
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ORDER 
/ 
Based upon these conclusions and Modular and Investor's supporting memoranda, the 
Court hereby: 
1. GRANTS Modular and Investors^ Motion for Summary Judgment in its entirety 
and enters a judgment of dismissal in favor of Modular and Investors and against the Ceas, 
dismissing with prejudice Plaintiffs' Seventh Cause of Action (Breach of Contract), Eighth 
Cause of Action (Fraud) and Ninth Cause of Action (Misrepresentation) as to Defendants 
Modular and Investors. 
2. JLUsJiH4ber^^ to Compel, filed on or about March 31. 
2010, is MOOT. JMnearing on that ijx5fion, which is set for October 26, 2010, is hereby 
stricken. 
3. A&-betweerrModu]ar and InvesFors^pd^flie Ceas, Modular and Investors are the 
prevailing parties. As such, Modular aod^fnvestors are entitled to an award of their costs 
incurred in this matter pursu^rrfto Rule 54(d)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Modular 
and Investors may^sefve and file their request for costs in accordance with Rule 54(d)(2) within 
five busnjes^(5) business days after the entry of this order. The amount requested may be done 
jptfitly with Roger Hoffman in a single memorandum of costs. 
o 
DATED this 2 ^ day of ,20 fb. 
BY THE COURT 
H#rforable Ernie W. Jones 
Second District Court Judge 
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This Order Granting Modular Manufacturing, LLC and Investors 
Collaborative, LLC Motion for Summary Judgment is approved as to form: 
KIRTON & McCONKlE 
By: 
Christopher S. Hill 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Modular Manufacturing, LLC, Investors 
Collaborative, LLC and Roger Hoffman 
VAN COTT BAGLEY CORNWALL & McCARTHY 
By: 
Florence M. Vincent 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
Al and Laura Cea 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the day of August, 2010,1 caused a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing |PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS MODULAR 
MANUFACTURING, LLC AND INVESTORS COLLABORATIVE, LLC'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT to be delivered in the following manner: 
Matthew F. McNulty, 111 
Florence M. Vincent 
VANCOTT, BAGLEY, 
CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
36 South State Street, #1900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Rjck Koerber 
6248 Lone Rock Road 
Highland, UT 84003-3723 
Mike Nyborg 
1478 North Parkway 
Centerville, UT 84014 
Brad C. Smith 
STEVENSON & SMITH, P.C. 
3986 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden,UT 84403 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
(X) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
(X) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
(X) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
(X) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
-ooOoo— 
UTAHAPP
^LATE COURTS 
OCT 2 6 2010 
Al Cea and Laura Cea, 
Plaintiffs and Petitioners, 
ATC Marketing, L.L.C. dba 
American Timbercraft; 18 Plus, 
L.L.C.; Modular Manufacturing, 
L.L.C.; Investors 
Collaborative, L.L.C; John A. 
Nipko; Mike Nyborg; Jeffrey 
Peacock; Roger Hoffman; Rick 
Koerber; and John Does 1-20, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
ORDER 
Case No. 20100728-CA 
Before Judges Davis, McHugh, and Voros. 
This matter is before the court on a petition for permission 
to appeal from an interlocutory order filed pursuant to rule 5 of 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition for permission to 
appeal is granted. 
DATED this 2^ day of October, 2010, 
FOR THE COURT: 
j\Fredaric Voros Jr., 
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I hereby certify that on October 26, 2010, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States 
mail or placed in Interdepartmental mailing to be delivered to: 
MIKE NYBORG 
14 78 N PARKWAY 
CENTERVILLE UT 84 014 
DAVID M. WAHLQUIST 
CHRISTOPHER S HILL 
KIRTON & MCCONKIE 
60 E S TEMPLE #1800 
PO BOX 45120 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84145-0120 
MATTHEW F. MCNULTY III 
FLORENCE M. VINCENT 
ALEX B LEEMAN 
VAN COTT BAGLEY CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
36 S STATE ST STE 1900 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111-1478 
BRAD C SMITH 
STEVENSON & SMITH PC 
3 98 6 WASHINGTON BLVD 
OGDEN UT 844 03 
BRYCE HIGBEE 
HIGBEE LAW INC 
727 N 1550 E STE 175 
OREM UT 84097 
SECOND DISTRICT, OGDEN DEPT 
ATTN: DIANE/ROXANNE/STELLA/BRADY 
252 5 GRANT AVE BX 044 8 
OGDEN UT 844 01 
Dated this October 26, 2010. 
- Q<wf 
Judicial Assistant 
Case No. 20100728 
SECOND DISTRICT, OGDEN DEPT, 080901240 
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